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ABSTRACT
WEB-DINAR:
WEB BASED DIAGNOSIS OF NETWORK AND APPLICATION RESOURCES IN
DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEMS
KARTIK DESHPANDE, B.E., PESIT BANGALORE
M.S.E.C.E, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Aura Ganz
Disaster management and emergency response mechanisms are coming of age post
9/11. Paper based triaging and evacuation is slowly being replaced with much advanced
mechanisms using remote clients (Laptops, Thin clients, PDAs), RFiDs etc. This
reflects a modern trend to deploy Information Technology (IT) in disaster management.
IT elements provide a great a deal of flexibility and seamlessness in the communication
of information. The information flowing is so critical that, loss of data is not at all
acceptable. Loss of data would mean loss of critical medical information portraying the
disaster scenario. This would amount to a wrong picture being painted of the disaster
incident. This basic idea led to the motivation of DiNAR (Diagnosis of Network and
Application Resource). The aim of DiNAR was to remotely monitor all the components
of the deployed system infrastructure (Remote clients, Servers) and if there is a fault in
the infrastructure (Hardware, Software or Communication) DiNAR captures the fault
alarm and do an event correlation to find the source of the problem.
The biggest challenge that lies here is the fact that the entities we are trying to monitor
are scattered around in the Internet. Traditional network management techniques always
assume that the network is within administrative control and every device we monitor is
v
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easily reachable on demand. But the ad-hoc scenario of deployment of disaster
management systems makes this task non trivial.
DiNAR has been designed with an aim to work with any application which has its
infrastructure elements scattered in the Internet space. DIORAMA (A real time disaster
management system) represents a new series of applications (especially in medical field)
where the deployment of network infrastructure is scattered around with Internet being
the backbone connector. Another such example is the Intel® Health Guide PHS6000
[1], which is used in patient monitoring in homes. This thesis work uses DIORAMA as
a case study application used to prove the concept of DiNAR.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Disasters are events that disrupt the normal functioning of the economy and society on
a large scale” [7]. One word to describe disaster events is complex. This complexity
comes from the sudden and abrupt nature of disasters. It disrupts the normal socioeconomic setup. Thus it is very essential that disaster response management is handled
by a specialized set of trained people in handling such events. It also needs a very
thoughtful and streamlined process. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) experts believe
that there are four major phases in disaster: “mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery” [7]. Of these four phases, the response and recovery from disaster pose the
biggest challenges for EMS officials. Disaster management has been a very vibrant area
of research from technological perspective off late. Till recently, it was considered a
much localized phenomenon where the efforts were based more on local resources and
organizations [7].
Disaster response management has seen significant growth in terms of technology and
processes after 9/11. One of the major reasons to this can be attributed to the need for
good evacuation and victim tracking mechanism, the lack of which contributed to
significant casualties during 9/11 and previous disasters. The traditional EMS disaster
evacuation process involved paramedics using paper tags with different color codes to
represent the victim condition [2]. The victims were tagged with these paper tags with
their corresponding color code. The paramedic then establishes contact with a command
center using the available communication mechanisms like satellite phones or other
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media to report the victims' statistics. This primitive method is now being replaced by
use of modern sensing technology and Internet. This advancement in technology adds
speed and ease of managing the information generated at the disaster site.

1.1. Example Of Information Technology (IT) In Disaster Management:

Figure 1.IT In Disaster Management [12]
A normal setup of disaster management system consists of a “Disaster Site” from where
emergency medical information is being collected and a “Remote Site” which is the
information sink for all the data.
Figure 1 shows an emergency response network with its main components such as
1) Wireless network devices deployed at the disaster site (used for both wireless local
area network communication and cellular communication). Such devices interconnect
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the devices in the disaster site as well as relay the information from the disaster site to
the remote site.
2) Computing and sensing devices at the disaster site such as Remote clients, RFID
readers. Such devices collect the relevant information from the disaster site, process it
and transmit it to the remote servers through the
This setup can change depending on the technology used to relay the information to the
remote site from the disaster site. If each device is empowered with Interconnectivity
using 3G/GPRS or other cellular technologies, the topology will look slightly different.
But the method of information collection across the two sites still remains the same.

1.2. Motivation for Dinar:
Modern day disaster management has Information Technology (IT) as a major player in
it. The activities which involve IT in this process are, identifying the EMS and related
resources, establishing connectivity with these resources and deploying them where
needed. This is then followed by coordinating the activities and providing
communication between various geographically separated locations [7]. The National
Academic Report (2007) [7] on use of IT for emergency response management gives us
some of the examples of application of IT in disaster response management. Some of
these use modern sensing technologies like RFID, sensor networks coupled with
wireless networks, Internet etc to provide an end to end solution for disaster
management. Thus forming a mini overlay network with the Internet as its backbone.
One of the primary motives of applying IT to disaster management is to provide quick
communication methodology and faster response time. It also helps in quickly building
3
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a high level view of the disaster scene. On a broad sense, it can be visualized as building
a seamless information flow from the site of disaster to the command centers where
actual decisions to act are taken.
Although IT makes disaster response management quick and simple, the biggest
question mark on its practical applicability lies in its reliability. It uses various elements
of IT like:
1. Internet
2. Remote clients and Servers
3. Wireless networking devices
4. Etc.
And all these elements have inherent potential to fail or to be mis-configured. Failure to
operate of any entity in any section of the information flow could lead to loss of the
critical information. This information lost would reflect in a wrong perception being
printed about the disaster. This is a potentially very dangerous situation. Use of
technology to solve problem can be potentially disastrous if the reliability is not
properly addressed. But we need to understand that the IT elements which constitute
disaster management systems are very volatile. Below are few of the scenarios of failure
of components which are common:
1. Application crashes
2. Device power outage
3. Wireless network access issues
4. Internet outages
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Thus any of the above scenarios would lead to loss of information which is getting
generated dynamically from the disaster site. It is very essential to understand the
criticality of this information which is getting lost. This information is getting generated
seamlessly from the disaster site and represents the state of victims. For example, an
application reading data from RFID readers could crash and lead to complete blacking
out of the RFID reader. This is not a hardware fault or a communication problem. Yet
the information is lost. This would mean loss of vital victim statistics. Hence every
piece of information being carried is very critical and there is a vulnerability of losing it.
Reliability is a big concern in a volatile system like this, or for that matter any enterprise
network. In practical world, failures cannot be avoided. But the robustness of a system
depends on how quick the failure is detected and recovered from. Traditional enterprise
networks invest heavily on softwares that do automated network management. Despite
of the sophisticated softwares, these networks still need the expertise of human element
in the form network administrators. But the rapidly deployed networks used in disaster
management face a very rare set of challenges. They are:
1. Lack of trained technical personnel on site to manage IT infrastructure failure.
2. The remote site network setups are very ad-hoc in nature and done in a short
span of time.
3. Certain failures in connectivity and data flow can never be recognized as
everything would look perfect from the outside.
Thus these new challenges should be addressed in a new way. The National Academics
report on “Improving Disaster Management: The Role of IT in Mitigation,
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery” [7] says that both agility and robustness of
5
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the IT infrastructure is very crucial for the proper operation of the disaster management
systems. Although it is a great idea to have a very robust and reliable system which is
operational and keeps information floating all the while, from a more technical
perspective it is important to understand that the entire IT infrastructure is volatile and
prone to failure. Thus we need a solution which makes the disaster management system
more agile and responsive to failures.
So with these factors in mind, we designed a reactive solution to address the
vulnerability of disaster management systems: DINAR, Diagnosis of Network and
Application Resources using a web based model. It is a network management
methodology adapted to suite the nature of disaster management and similar systems.
Chapter 2 describes the Backgroud and Related Work. In chapter 3 we introduce
DiNAR and talk about its architecture and design. This is followed by implementation
details in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the System evaluation and results.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Network resource management has been a traditional research problem. Over the years
multiple solutions have been proposed and implemented. Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) [3] has been predominantly used by many commercial products.
SNMP uses a Manager-Agent model, where every managed node in the network hosts a
SNMP agent which reports health information to the SNMP manager. The architecture
of an SNMP based management system is as shown in Figure. 2.

SNMP
Agent

SNMP
Manager

SNMP Messages

MIB

Figure 2 SNMP Architecture
SNMP Manager is a centralized node which is responsible for collecting the network
information from each individual node which is running an SNMP Agent. The agent is
software running on every node which collects health information about the local
hardware and software environment. This information is stored in a localized database
known as Management Information Base (MIB). SNMP assumes the entire manageable
network to be under one administrative domain.
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Outside SNMP, there have been lots of efforts in designing network management
systems for different application scenarios. We will briefly explore three such designs.

1.

Web Based Enterprise Management (WBEM):

WBEM [6] brings interoperability among management solution providers. It was
introduced by Distributed Management Task Force to standardize the XML based
network management protocols. XML based methods are a new class of management
standards which use XML for data representation. WBEM defines a set of management
and Internet standards to bring together management of distributed environments.
WBEM is defined by three main components:


Common Information Model (CIM): CIM is a standard which defines how to model
network, application and other business processes in enterprise and service provider
environments. It uses a standard object oriented structure using classes, properties,
methods and relations (also known as associations).



HttpAccess: Http acts as the transport mechanism in WBEM. HttpAccess
component defines the specifics of http requests used to perform the CIM operations
over the network.



XmlCIM: WBEM defines xmlCIM which defines the xml grammar for mapping the
CIM classes into XML elements and the CIM class properties into attributes. This is
done by defining the XML Document Type Data (DTD). The DTDs specify the
XML grammar for CIM. This component holds a very important key in achieving
Interoperability.
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With use of XML and HTTP WBEM has overcome one of the limitations posed by
SNMP, i.e. the management traffic will not be blocked by service providers as it looks
same as a web traffic. But the manager would still need the exact IP or URL to access
the devices. This cannot be expected in the typical emergency response setup. This
inspires for the design of a system management method which suits this special scenario
where different entities are scattered across the Internet.

2.

Ad-hoc Network Management Protocol (ANMP) [14]:

ANMP is a management framework with special design considerations for ad-hoc
networks, mainly used in battlefield and emergency response systems [14]. It uses a
policy based management mechanism. The network requirements are expressed as high
level policies. There is a hierarchy of policy agents which realize these policies and also
report management information to a global policy agent. ANMP was developed with
two basic motives:
It should be lightweight and suitable for Ad hoc networks.
It should be compatible with SNMP.
ANMP uses its version of MIB to store the information of the Ad hoc network devices.
It also supports alarms like SNMP traps to have asynchronous reporting of problems.

3. Yelp Announce Protocol (YAP):
YAP is a network configuration management scheme [15] which collects configuration
settings from all the managed entities and stores them. The YAP architecture consists of
a YAP Server and multiple YAP Relays. YAP Relays are like SNMP agents, but with a
9
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difference. Instead of responding to requests from the manager, they relay the
management information at regular intervals to the YAP server. The YAP server on the
other hand collects as well as distributes configuration information through the relays.
This theme of relaying data from the YAP Agents (Relays) without being polled by the
manager, presents an interesting idea and food for thought. This scheme, although very
pertinent to collection of configuration information, can also be applied to network
health information collection.
As discussed earlier, emergency response systems and applications like Diorama pose a
special set of challenges on the management methodology. This makes choosing of one
among the above said protocols directly difficult. The primary reasons for this are:


Non existence of a single administrative domain: All management solutions expect
all the nodes to be within the same administrative domain. However, in emergency
response networks, infrastructure elements are in separate sites and are connected
through the Internet. Thus having one administrative domain is ruled out.



Explicit addressing: Explicit addressing of managed nodes is a must. However, we
can not provide such guarantee for a volatile and mobile network like the disaster
management network.

In the next section we introduce DiNAR management solution which overcomes these
challenges while using some of the principles used in all three of the modern network
management methods presented above. DiNAR has been developed to adapt to
applications of different needs. In this thesis work, Diorama has been used as a case
study for implementing the proof of DiNAR concept. In the rest of the document, we
use Diorama as an example under all scenarios.
10
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CHAPTER 3
DINAR: CONCEPT, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

We understood in the previous chapters that present day network management methods
altough effective and robust, are not suitable for applications which have infrastructure
elements scattered across internet and rely on Internet as a backbone. It should be noted
that we are not considering multiple office sites connected via VPN (over internet) as an
example of such an application. Figure 1 shows a typical example of the target
application. Ex. Diorama [Appendix A]. The primary reasons why SNMP, WBEM and
other existing architectures cannot be used for applications like DIORAMA are:
The communication between the manager and the agents goes through networks
which are outside the administrative controls.
Lack of explicit addressing. There is no direct way the manager can contact the
agents and vice-versa using the addressing scheme (IP).
To overcome these challenges, DiNAR has been designed with the following design
goals:
Provide seamless information flow between agents and managers irrespective of
the locations of the agents (provided there is network connectivity)
Use a Push paradigm instead of a request response paradigm to overcome the
need of explicit addressing.
Finally to have the system as simple as possible at the disaster site. The aim is to
avoid any configuration or setting up processes on the disaster site by the
paramedics.
11
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3.1. Dinar Architecture
DiNAR architecture follows a Manager-Agent based model and draws inspiration from
WBEM[6] and YAP[14] in the way management information is represented and
collected. DiNAR architecture consists of two main entities, the DiNAR manager and
agent. An agent is a daemon service installed on all managed nodes in the field like
PDAs, laptops, wireless routers etc. While a Manager which resides on a server in the
remote control center is a central application to which agents report the management
information. Figure 3 depicts the DiNAR architecture over the Diorama setup shown in
Figure 1.

Figure 3.DiNAR Architecture
12
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As shown in Figure 3, DiNAR consists of the following three major components:
1) DiNAR Manager: Manager is the centralized web server which collects information
about all the nodes in the infrastructure. A detailed architecture of the manager and its
subcomponents is discussed later in the chapter.
2) DiNAR Agent: Agent is a daemon process running on every computing node in the
system (Remote clients, Web servers etc). Its job is to collect the health information of
its environment and report it to the Manager. More details about the agent are discussed
later in the chapter.
3) Directory Server: The directory server helps the agents to locate the manager on the
World Wide Web. This acts a single point of reference to manager location and leaves
the manager location flexible. More details about the directory server are discussed later
in the chapter.
We now begin to analyze each component of DiNAR in greater detail and how they help
in achieving the design goals of DiNAR.

3.2. Dinar Agent
The DINAR agent is a process which runs on every managed device. Its primary tasks
are:


Collect status parameters for the device on which it is running and also from
interfaced gadgets and applications running on the same machine.



Contact and establish connection with the DINAR Manager.



Send updates at regular pre decided intervals .

13
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The agent is an independent application running on the device and has no relation with
the other applications that are running. Figure 4 shows a block diagram view of an
agent. The functionality of an agent has been split into multiple components with a
motive to keep things simple and modularized. It also allows future expansion and
customization of the agent. Let us look into each component in detail:

AgentDaemon

Information Engine

Generic
App
Adapter Adapter

HttpClient Module

XYZ
Adapter

To Manager
Figure 4 DiNAR Agent architecture



Agent Daemon: This is the main backbone process which controls all the other
components of an agent. Whenever the agent is started, it is this daemon process
which kicks off. One of the initial tasks for this daemon is to locate the manager and
initiate a contact. Locating the manager is achieved using the Directory server which
is described in greater detail. So as of now we can safely assume that the manager
location (URL) is known. After the initial contact with the manager, the agent starts
the information engine and receives regular updates from it. This update information
is structured and passed onto the manager at regular intervals. Thus agent daemon is
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the nucleus of the DINAR agent and controls all its operation.


HttpClient module: This is the communication engine of the agent. The agent
communicates with the manager using the Http protocol. The HttpClient module
manages the establishment and maintenance of the Http Connection with the
manager. It uses the Apache HttpClient 3.1 library to perform all the Http
operations. It also tries to maintain only one connection to the manager throughout
and keep this connection persistent. This means all Http messages will be sent on
the same TCP connection. Persistence is achieved using Http 1.1 which pipelines
multiple requests onto same HTTP connection. DiNAR manager expects the
connection from the agent to last until it’s operational in the field under ideal
circumstances. The manager sets a timeout value of 60 seconds. This means any
agent idle beyond 60 seconds is considered to be unreachable for the moment.
Although this does not brand the Agent or the link to be down. The manager does
further processing to determine if agent is truly down. More details about event
processing done by the manager are described in Section 3.3.4 (Analysis Engine).



Information Engine: The information engine is like the Management Information
Base (MIB) in SNMP. It stores all the relevant and needed status parameters and
tracks them continuously. As described above, the agent daemon interfaces with the
information engine to get hold of the current state of the machine and pass the
information. The information engine in itself is of not much value. It just acts a
central docking point for all information adapters. Information Adapters are
specialized modules for continuously monitoring a certain environment and getting
its state information. In Figure 4, all modules displayed in blue represent
15
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information adapters. They are started in cascade to the Information engine.
Individual adapters are invoked by the Information Engine at a predefined interval to
collect the present state information for the components they are responsible. E.g. an
adapter responsible for collecting the health information of all the aplications on the
Diorama server is invoked every x seconds where x is configurable based on the
user’s requirement. “x” here is called the refresh interval. DiNAR sets the default
value of 60 seconds. This is arrived at based on the tests conducted on the
performance of the Agent process for varying refresh interval. We then did a trade
off between the performance and the freshness of the information to conclude 60
seconds as an ideal refresh interval.


Information Adapters: As mentioned above information adapters are specialized
modules for continuously monitoring a certain environment and getting its state
information. The number and class of adapters can be customized. If the device is a
hand-held device in the field, then it can have adapters for the interfaced gadgets,
applications etc. If the device is a central web server, then it would mainly contain
application adapters. The application adapters keep track of all the managed
applications and monitor their status continuously. We developed an application
adapter for Servers and other Client machines running windows. This gives us the
dynamic availability and performance statistics of the listed applications. Apart from
the specific adapters, all agents have a mandatory generic adapter. The function of
generic adapter is to gather vital parameters of the health of the machine itself like
CPU usage, memory usage etc. Except the generic adapter, the rest are optional.
This architectural decision on information adapters will help in making DINAR
16
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apply to wide variety of scenarios. Anybody can write a custom adapter and plug it
into the agent. This can help a great deal in customizing the agent according to the
needs. We developed the generic adapter and an application adapter for windows
environment.

3.2.1. XML Representation
As discussed above, XML is used to model the management information. In this section
we will take a look at sample XML update sent from an agent and understand its
structure:
Start Element
DeviceType
MetaTag

Component Tag

As shown above, every agent update begins with a “DINAR” start tag. This is followed
by the tag which represents the type of device which is reporting. Within this we have
the XML tags representing the components which the agent is collecting data for. In
17
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some

cases

there

can

be

meta

tags

like

the

one

shown

above

e.g.

DINAR_GenericAppHeader. The meta tag is used by adapters to group multiple peer
tags coming from same adapter.

3.2.3. Agent ID
AgentId is the unique id to represent the agent in the manager repository. To ensure
uniqueness across multiple sites, we use the MAC address of the device to be its
AgentID. This helps maintaining the uniqueness off the agent.

3.2.2. Agent Bootup and Configuration:

Figure 5.Manager Agent interaction
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As soon as the agent boots up and knows the URL at which the manager is residing, it
first issues an HTTP request with messageType set to “Hi”. Along with this, it also
sends a polling interval, which indicates to the manager the frequency with which it
should expect updates. If the manager receives all this information correctly, then it
would send a “Hi” response. The agent which receives the “Hi” response now knows
that the initial handshake has ended succesfully. The agent now sends the skeleton XML
document which represents the device, applications and the attached gadgets which the
agent will be monitoring. There are no status updates in this XML document, just the
skeletal XML. After receiving this skeletal document successfully the manager sends
back an ACK to indicate to the agent that everything was received successfully. After
the ACK is received, the agent starts a timer and after every t secs (equal to polling
interval) it sends out the update XML document. Figure 5 depicts these handshake
messages. This continues unless and until the agent or the manager are stopped or the
communication is affected.

3.3. Dinar Manager
DiNAR manager is the focal point of the whole DiNAR system. It is the information
sink for all the DiNAR agents running across the environment. Hence we can define the
DiNAR manager as a central application which receives and processes the management
information. The manager can also be visualized as a web server listening for agent
updates on one of the Http ports. The Figure.6 shows the block diagram view of the
DINAR Manager and its components.


Manager Servlet: This module acts as a global interface of the manager. It listens
19
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on the assigned manager port and accepts the updates from all the agents. The
updates from the agents are in XML format. The servlet extracts the xml data and
passes it to the XML parser for further processing.


XML Parser: The XML parser module parses the incoming xml data from the
servlet and creates objects for each of the Element in the xml document. DiNAR
manager uses a DOM parser. Each Incoming XML tag is converted into an object
(except few meta tags) defined in the Data model (Explained in section 3.3.2).



Object Pool: The DINAR manager looks at every device and its components and
attachments as an object defined in its Data model. Even the DINAR agent is
represented as an object in the pool. It instantiates an object for every new device or
component it manages. This object is an abstraction of the real device. Whenever
updates are received for an already created object, only the property of the object is
updated. Objects follow the class structure defined in the DiNAR data model which
represents the blueprint of the topology and all its classes.


Alarm Module: This module is responsible for triggering alarms based on
the properties of the objects in the object repositories. The agents transmit
abnormal activity reports using the status attribute for each object. Based on
this, the alarm module triggers alarms to highlight the problem. These alarms
are then picked up by the analysis engine for alarm correlation.



Analysis Engine: The goal of this module is to analyze the management data
received from the agents. It consists of an event correlation engine which correlates
the alarms. The Analysis engine is explained in greater detail in section 3.3.4.

20
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Analysis Engine

Object Repository
Alarm
Module

Agent updates

Manager
Servlet

XML
Parser

Figure 6.DINAR Manager Architecture

3.3.1. Alarm Model
Alarm model defines the set of alarms that can be triggered by the Alarm Module. It is
very specific to the application for which DiNAR is being used. We developed an alarm
model for DIORAMA[Appendix A] application. Figure 7 shows the alarm model for
DIORAMA application.
The alarm model is implemented as an inheritance of Java classes where each event
inherits from a parent event. In Figure 7, Event is the base alarm which contains basic
properties of an alarm. This is then inherited by the other other alarms as shown in the
Figure 7.
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Figure 7.DIORAMA Alarm Model

3.3.2 Data Model
DiNAR Data Model is the blueprint which the DiNAR manager uses in creating the
abstract topology. The is represented by an interrelated set of classes which are specific
to an application. In this section we will demonstrate the modeling of DIORAMA
system. Data model forms an important part of the application as all the objects in the
object pool of the manager depend on the data model. For the purpose of DIORAMA,
we designed a data model encompassing all the components of DIORAMA. Figure 8
below shows the complete data model for DIORAMA. Each of the class is represented
using a rectangular box. For example DINAR_ClientDevice is a class which represents
any generic computing device in the disaster site. These classes are then linked using
arrows. These arrows indicate class inheritance. Lets consider the DINAR_ClientDevice
example. This class has two subclasses: DINAR_TrackDevice and DINAR_SiteDevice.
The former represents a D-Track device as defined by DIORAMA [Appendix A] while
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the later represents a generic purpose remote client. The arrows used always point
towards the base class. Other than the directed arrows, the other connections between
the classes are known as relationships between them. Relationships are all unidirectional
and each relationship has a converse to it.
The naming of the classes and the relations has been done following the CIM
guidelines. CIM classes are named in two strings separated using an “_”. The first string
is known as the domain name and should be constant throughout the model. This model
all in all represents the entire DIORAMA system. Figure 8 shows the diorama data
model. In this model, even DINAR_Agent is treated as an object and as a part of the
repository.

Figure 8.DiNAR Data Model for DIORAMA
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3.3.3. Cloud Aggregation
DiNAR was aimed to be applied on distributed applications which have multiple sites
and whose elements interact over the internet E.g DIORAMA [Appendix A]. In
DIORAMA, the disaster site devices connect to the internet using a wireless LAN
(WLAN). This wireless LAN comprises of a wireless router. To model this network
scenario, we defined a new entity in the DiNAR model known as “Cloud”. A cloud is
meant to represent a particular disaster site location. Every agent sending updates from a
particular disaster site is believed to behind a cloud representing its site. Figure 9 shows
a capture from the DiNAR console where two agents reporting from the same site are
clubbed under a single cloud.

Figure 9.Cloud
The source IP of the HTTP connection coming into the manager is used to define a
cloud. All agents within a single WLAN will be having the same source public IP.

3.3.4 Analysis Engine
The analysis engine is the module responsible for performing alarm correlation on all
the triggered alarms in the DiNAR repository. Figure 10 shows a block diagram view of
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the analysis engine and its components.

Figure 10.Analysis Engine
Dependency Graph: Our Analysis engine has been built using the Dependency
graph based event correlation algorithm [8]. Dependency graph is a mechanism
where the different classes in the data model share a dependency relationship
between them. This dependency can be read as “Fault in class A will lead to
Fault in class B” [8]. Thus class B is dependent on A. This schema helps us to
build a hierarchical structure of dependencies among components. The alarm
correlation algorithm uses the dependency graph as an input. To build the
dependency graph we use the DiNAR Data model as a reference for
relationships between the devices. While designing the dependency graph we
condensed the graph as much as possible to its base classes. Thus if any class in
the Data Model is not shown in the dependency graph, its base class needs to be
looked up. Figure 11 below shows the Dependency graph for DIORAMA.
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Figure 11.Dependency Graph
Correlator: The correlation algorithm uses the dependency graph to reach to the
root cause of a fault. It correlates multiple alarms and filters out alarms which
are caused due to failure in parent components. It also helps in pointing out the
more pertinent problem, resolution of which can be a possible resolution of the
other. Although this might not be always true. The dependency graph correlation
algorithm [8] implemented in DiNAR works as explained below
o The correlator kicks in every 60 seconds and builds the dependency
graph using the above blueprint.
o It then traces through the graph and assigns respective alarms to each
object (if any).
o It then marks all the leaf nodes with alarms and starts analysing them in a
loop
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o For every alarm in a node, it checks to see if the object on which it
depends has an alarm. We define a certain set of alarms to be unrelated.
E.g a HighCPUUtilization alarm on the Application server is not related
to an ApplicationDown alarm although Application Classes are
dependent on the DINAR_Node class. If the alarms in the parent and the
child object are not Unrelated, then the alarm in the parent is considered
to be the cause of the algorithm in the child object.
o If the alarm in the parent object is concluded as the cause then the alarm
in child object is marked as a symptom and the parent object alarm is
now processed recurcively. If not, the child object alarm is itself marked
as a root cause.

3.4. Directory Server
Locating a manager involves finding the exact hostname (or IP) and the http port on
which it is listening. Launching a full fledged directory service would mean, the agents
having the capability of finding the manager address using broadcast. However this is
not feasible in the present setup. So we add a step of indirection to reach to the actual
manager. Instead of the manager's address, all the agents would contain the address of a
pre coded directory server. This directory server will then know the address to the actual
manager. So as soon as the agents boot up, they will first contact the directory server
and request for the location of the manager. The directory server responds with the
manager URL. Hence with one additional step, the agent can get the manager address
dynamically. Even if the manager location changes, only the directory server needs to be
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updated and not all the agents. Thus, this approach is more scalable. The requirements
of a directory server are to have a URL which is constant all the time.

Figure 12.Directory Server Operation
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
4.1 Dinar Agent:
This has been implemented in core Java SE. Some of the highlights of the agent
development were:
 It is a single threaded application. This was done mainly due to
 Reduce load on the agent machines
 Agent has a fixed update interval. Hence data collected between update
cycles is of not much use if overwritten
 Uses HttpClient 4.0 module to perform http 1.1 operations.
 Agent was developed only on Java Standard Edition. Hence it cannot be ported to a
mobile device. Attempts to port the agent onto a mobile device were not succesful
owing to the stripped down version of the Java Mobile Edition which does not
support the core HttpClient 4.0 API. Hence development of agent on mobile devices
needs to be done using the local development frameworks provided by the vendor.
 It uses the NSClient service to pull the health information from Windows hosts like
uptime, cpuUtilization.

4.2 Dinar Manager
DiNAR manager is a multithreaded J2EE application. It contains of two main threads:
 Thread 1 : Main thread responsible for collecting updates from agents and
creating the abstract topology
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 Thread 2 : Alarm correlation engine thread
Manager uses the XML Schema Definition (XSD) to validate the incoming data before
processing the agent updates.
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CHAPTER 5
SYSTEM EVALUATION

The previous chapter described the details of DiNAR system architecture and
implementation. To summarize, DiNAR system can be broadly visualized as shown by
Figure 13.

Monitoring
XML Data from
field agents

Alarms

Diagnosis / Alarm
Correlation
Root Cause
Faults

Figure 13.DiNAR Summarized
The system evaluation strategy was concentrated on segregating every independent
component of the system and testing it individually. It was the followed by a complete
feature testing to test the resultant output of the system. This chapter discusses the
testing schemes, parameters considered and the test bench details followed by the results
of the system evaluation.
5.1. Testing Scheme:
DiNAR system evaluation tests have been classified as:
Tests in the Monitoring phase.
Tests in the Diagnosis phase.
Figure 14 below shows the DiNAR test model and the functionality being tested at the
end of every phase (sub phase). The system evaluation used two testing methodology.
1) Live topology testing.
2) Simulated topology using test bench.
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Faults on components
(Persistent and spurious faults)
Network Fault Model [11]

Abstract Topology
Generation

Abstract
Topology

Test 1

Alarm Generation
Monitoring

Test 2

Alarms
Diagnosis
Alarms Correlator :
Dependency Graph
Algorithm
*
Root Cause
Test 3
Faults

Figure 14.Testing Model

1) Live topology testing: DiNAR agents were deployed in three laptops running
Windows operating system and on a web server running a server version of Windows.
One of the laptop agents was made to portray as a mobile device agent. The web server
agent was in a separate cloud thean the rest. The manager collected health information
from all the agents. Faults were induced into this setup. We used the Network Fault
Model (NFM) [11] which defines 5 different types of faults possible in a networked
application.
Drop
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Cut
Lost
Corrupt
Carrier
NFM faults are designed for individual packets, but as DiNAR abstracts packet level
details, we considered every HTTP request/communication as an atomic entity and
applied this model.
2) Simulated topology using test bench.
We developed a test bench to simulate multiple agents. Each agent is feeded with a
separate configuration file and an internal topology. The agents in the test bench
function like any normal agents, except that it does not have an Information Engine. It
picks up the topology information from a hard coded XML. The agentID of the
simulated agents is preassigned using a configuration file.
The test bench introduced the faults as mentioned in the Network Fault model [11]
using a FaultInduction thread. This thread is a daemon which introduces faults by.
Stopping and starting agents.
Changing status information of individual components.

5.2. Test Cases and Results
Figure 14 shows three tests (Test1, Test2 and Test3) conducted at various breakpoints in
the DiNAR system. Apart from these, we conducted two more tests to understand the
performance of the system and to obtain optimal update and refresh time intervals. In
this section we look and analyze the results of the tests.
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5.2.1. Test 1: Abstraction Accuracy
Abstraction accuracy is the measure of closeness between the actual topology in the
field to the abstracted topology in DiNAR manager. We define this metric based on the
relationships between each component. To measure this subjective metric, we used the
following technique:
On the agent side,
o (a1) Every component (sub component) to be measured is assigned 1
point.
o (a2) Every relationship to be built is assigned 1 point.
On the Manager side
o (m1) Every component seen on the manager is assigned one point.
o (m2) Every correctly built relationship between the components by the
manager is assigned one point.
(a3 and m3) Finally, the correct grouping of agents under respective clouds
(reflecting their locations physically) needs to be considered. To correctly
capture this metric, we assign 1 point for every cloud object seen on the manager
(a3) and 1 point for every remote site under consideration(m3).
All the points from both the agent side and the manager side are summed up. The
Abstraction Accuracy is finally calculated as
(m1 + m2 + a3) * 100 / (a1 + a2 +m3)
Note that m3 and a3 are swapped to give a correct meaning. Theoretically it is not
possible to get m3 < a3.
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We conducted tests using the live physical topology as mentioned in section 4.1 and
simulated agents using the DiNAR test bench with varying number of agents (1-6)
under each site. The topology consisted of two sites to depict the disaster site and the
command center.
Results:
The tests were conducted considering the following assumption. All agents in a single
site were connected to Internet through a wireless LAN which had a single vertical
connection. This meant all of them were behind a natted gateway. Under these
circumstances we observed 100% accuracy in abstraction.
The other network setup which should ideally be considered is when every agent device
has a separate vertical link. This is scenario when every client device in the disaster site
has 3G connectivity and the site has no internal LAN. From DiNAR perspective, the
topology remains the same per agent. The only factor that gets affected is the
classification of agents into respective Clouds. This depends on the external IP of the
device individually unlike the case of a LAN network. The external IP is allotted by the
base station to these 3G clients using their Access Point Names (APNs) and is not
consistent for all the devices. We could not completely test this network scneario due to
lack of enough hardware for 3G/GPRS connectivity. But we observed the assignment of
external IPs using 4 iPhones with 3g connectivity. It was observed that irrespective of
same location, all of them got separate external IPs all the time. This would mean
DiNAR manager will show all 4 of them in separate clouds.
Thus assuming we had hypothetical agents installed on each of these iPhone, the
abstraction accuracy of this scenario would be (x)/(x + 3).
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Where x is the sum of points for all other components.
5.2.2. Test 2: Spurious alarm suppression
One of the biggest challenges faced by Network management systems is the ability to
handle spurious alarms. Spurious alarms are unavoidable in any network scenario. Such
alarms originate mainly due to:
Temporary loss of connectivity
Temporary unresponsiveness of applications.
Etc.
DiNAR uses a wait and hold approach to handle spurious. The wait time before an event
is considered non spurious is equal to two update cycles. To test spurious alarm
suppression and robustness of DiNAR we used the Network Fault Model (NFM) [11]
which defines 5 types of faults possible in a packet based network. Although it’s not
completely appropriate in our scenario, we only consider a subset of this model. The
fault types Drop, Lost, Corrupt are relevant in DiNAR perspective. The other two,
Carrier and Cut are very specific to packet level granularity and are not relevant in a
system which abstracts at the level of HTTP.
Test: The goal of this test is to check the robustness of DiNAR against errors and
spurious alarms. The test bed was created using the DiNAR test bench. The topology
consisted of 3 simulated agents per site and two such sites. The update interval was set
to 60 seconds. The Network Fault Model was then applied by inducing the following
faults:
Drop: We induced this fault by introducing syntactical errors in the XML being
sent. This leads to the server dropping this update.
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Loss: This error type was achieved by stopping the agent for a varied time
intervals between 0 seconds to 180 seconds (at samples of 10 seconds)
successively. The time instance at which the agent is stopped is also critical in
this test. For this we chose the two extreme ends. The agent was paused once
immediately after a previous update. We called this as t=0. The next test had the
agent stopped right before an update. We called this as t=60.
Corrupt: Corrupted data can be of many forms. In our tests we considered
corrupted data in two ways.
o Wrong status information about components. Involved flipping of the
status from Running to Crashed etc. We flipped the status information of
components. 5 such components retained this curruption for a single
update cycle, while remaining 5 components retained this corrupted
status information for 2 or 3 update cycles.
o Syntactically correct, yet semantically wrong information which does not
mean anything from DiNAR perspective. This test involved changing the
“status” attribute of a component to “XYZ” and keeping it same for 10
consecutive update cycles.
Results:
Drop: All the syntactically errorenous XML messages were rejected without any
failure. But as the HTTP connection is still alive, an Unresponsive alarm for the
device is not fired and this was a just result. Yet this was logged in the server
logs but not shown in the GUI as a design consideration.
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Loss: We tabulated the percentage of spurious alarms suppressed under both the
cases and is shown in Table 1 below. The suppression window shows the
minimum amount of time for which spurious alarms can be suppressed for two
different values of “t”.
Time Instance (t)

Suppression Window (in sec)

0

180

60

120

Table 1 Spurious alarm Suppression Window
Corrupt: For the two types of data corruption mentioned above:
o Wrong status values:


For all the components which held the corrupted data for just 1
update cycle and then the corrected values were injected, DiNAR
manager was successful in suppressing the alarms as transitive
and no alarm was generated.



For the components which transmitted the corrupted data for 2 or
3 update cycles and then cleared the alarm, alarms was generated
which eventually were cleared. However, these were shown on
the GUI and were a part of the Alarm Correlation process.

o All incoherent values in the XML input from the agents were ignored by
the DiNAR manager. Yet this was logged in the server logs but not
shown in the GUI as a design consideration.
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5.2.3. Test 3: Diagnosis Phase testing
In Chapter 3 we introduced the dependency graph event correlation technique to
diagnose the alarms generated by the DiNAR agents. To measure the effectiveness of
this method in our application, we used the following two metric.


Convergence time: This metric indicates time taken for the dependency graph
algorithm to reach to its final conclusion. It is measured from the time the algorithm
is invoked with a set of alarms to the time it reaches its final conclusion.



Percentage False positives/False negatives of root cause detection: This metric
indicates the number of faults wrongly detected (or not detected) in the experimental
setup.

Test Conducted:
To compute the convergence time of the correlation algorithm, we used the simulated
test bench with 20 agents. The performance of the dependency graph based correlation
algorithm depends on the depth of the graph (L) for every correlation [8]. Based on the
dependency graph for DIORAMA, we have maximum depth of L=3. Our test cases
consisted of generating 1-20 alarms of both L=2 and L=3 depth. We calculated the time
taken by the correlation algorithm to reach to its end for each of the 20 X 2 cases. Figure
15 shows the plot of convergence time against number of alarms in the system.
One factor which affected the convergence time was the thread dispatching schedule of
the JVM as correlation engine is a separate Java thread. However we reduced the effect
of thread dispatch by having no I/O statements.
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Figure 15.Convergence Time
Correlation accuracy and false positives: Event correlation in DiNAR unlike other
network management applications is less complex. This is due to the unidirectional
architecture of dependencies. Accuracy in correlation is a metric to measure the
outcome of the event correlator. In the above experimental setup, following were the
shortcomings observed in our event correlation engine.
1.

A Device down alarm which was adjudged as the root cause overruled
other actual alarms from its components (E.g. Application down) even though
the later was a correct alarm and not a symptom of Device being down.

2.

Cloud unresponsive alarm is based on the status of all the agents. It
assumes that if all agents are down, then there is a network level problem in the
site (Cloud).
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Apart from these two, the correlation engine was successful in showcasing the correct
and the most pertinent problem with highest amount of severity. Although point number
1 above discusses a behavior of the engine where actual alarms from subcomponents are
suppressed by actual alarms from its dependent component, it does prove to be logical
from administrative point of view. For example, in a case where we have an alarm for
both the Device and its hosted application being down, it is logical to advise the
administrator to first look at the Device failure problem. Table 2 shows a summary of
the results of correlation for different failure scenarios.
Correlation Algorithm
Successful in pointing to all the
right problems?

Failure Scenario
Only ApplicationUnresponsive
Only ApplicationDown
Only HighCPUUtilization
Only RfidReaderDown
Application and Host device
Down
RFiD Reader and Host device
Down

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

RFiD Reader and Interfacing
application Down

Yes

RFiD Reader, Host device and
Interfacing Application Down

Not Always

Application/RFiD reader Down
along with High CPU Utilization
in the host device

Yes

All agents in cloud Down
Only 1 agent in the cloud is Up

Yes
Yes

Table 2 Summary of Correlation Results
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5.3. Agent Overhead:
In this section we discuss the overhead posed by the Agent running on the devices. We
consider two types of overhead here:
Bandwidth Overhead
CPU Overhead
5.3.1. Bandwidth Overhead
Bandwidth overhead is measured as the additional bits per second (bps) contributed by
each agent. To measure this metric, the test setup consisted of four live agents
connected to the internet through a wireless LAN. We used the Cradle Point setup as
used in a real DIORAMA scenario. The test consisted a mock 10 min sessions involving
all the 4 agents reporting health information about the device and monitoring 3
applications. For each 10 min sessions we varied the update interval ranging from 10
seconds to 120 seconds and measured the bandwidth addition (in terms of bits per
second) by each agent. The bandwidth was measured for the entire http flow between
the agent and the manager.
Figure 16 shows the per agent bandwidth contribution for different update intervals. It
needs to be noted that, these values are specific to the amount of information being sent,
which depends on the number of information adapters. If there is significant increase in
the number of information adapters, then the bandwidth addition will be higher.
However, the relative proportions will remain the same.
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Figure 16 Bandwidth Overhead
5.3.2. CPU Overhead
CPU overhead is a measure of the processing overhead added by running the Agent on
the agent devices. To measure the CPU over head we calculated the total time taken by
one update cycle of the agent. This involves the time to collect information from all the
adapters and transmit it across to the manger. For the test scenario mentioned in section
5.3.1, the average CPU time for one update cycle of the agent is 1224 ms.
For the mock 10 min test scenario, with varying update intervals, the total CPU time can
be represented as 1224*U ms, where U is the number of update cycles. The lower the
update interval, higher is the value of U and more is the CPU overhead.

5.3.3. Choice of Update Interval
The results obtained in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 helps us understand the choice of 60
seconds as the ideal update interval for all DiNAR agents. Figure 16 shows the varying
bandwidth overhead for varying update intervals for a fixed duration of time. Based on
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this, it is ideal to have longer update intervals which reduce the overall overhead of the
agent. But longer update intervals lead to less fresh data at the manager. It also means
slow realization of failures by the Manager. Table 3 displays the minimum time needed
to fire the Device and Component alarms for different update intervals.

10

Device
Alarms
(Sec)
80

Component
Alarms
(Sec)
20

20

100

40

30

120

60

40

140

80

50

160

100

60

180

120

70

200

140

80

220

160

90

240

180

100

260

200

110

280

220

120

300

240

Update
Interval

Table 3Alarm Generation Time
As seen in Table 3, the time needed to trigger an alarm after a failure grows significantly
for higher update intervals. For update interval of 120 seconds, the time to obtain device
failure alarm is 5 mins. This is a very long time period for a scenario like DIORAMA
where the actual times of operations. At the other end of the table, the duration to trigger
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device alarms are in the range of 80/100 seconds. The duration for component alarms is
20/40 seconds. This is a very less amount of time to trigger the alarm considering the
transient failures. Such low time periods for alarm generation will also affect the
windows size for spurious alarm suppression as discussed in section 5.2.2.
Thus the choice of update interval was made considering a tradeoff between alarm
generation time and agent overhead. Hence update interval ranging between 50-70
seconds is a good design choice considering the trade offs.
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CHAPTER 6

REPAIR AND RECOVERY MEASURES FOR DIORAMA

In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we presented the details of DiNAR system and its evaluation
results. DiNAR as a tool helps guide the system administrator to have a complete view
of the IT infrastructure elements of DIORAMA. It helps detect the faults and analyze
these fault alarms through an alarm correlation engine. In this chapter we attempt to
provide the corrective actions that can be invoked based the alarms raised by DiNAR.
To understand these corrective measures, we divide the whole DIORAMA setup into its
two predominant zones
Disaster site
Remote site (Command Center)
6.1. Disaster Site
The disaster site is the area which generates the information about a particular disaster
which has just occurred. This information being generated is very critical to the correct
portrayal of the actual scenario. DIORAMA [Appendix A] uses PDAs and RFiD readers
to collect information about the victim’s position and this information is transmitted to
the Remote server using the wireless LAN.
Disaster response activities are conducted for a short duration of time. This duration
depends on the seriousness of the calamity. So disaster response systems are active and
operational only during this period. Unlike regular wired and wireless networks,
Disaster response systems like DIORAMA are setup and dismantled once the activity is
over. Hence the requirement of the IT infrastructure in systems like DIORAMA is not
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perennial. However, that does not undermine the need of high availability of these
components during the actual times of operation. Rather they are very critical during the
operational periods.
A complete recovery model for a disaster response system like DIORAMA is beyond
the scope of this work. Hence here we provide the suggestive measures the
administrators can take for different types of fault alarms triggered by DiNAR. For
DIORAMA, whose availability requirements range from very high during the times of
operation to almost zero once the evacuations are done, the recovery measures for IT
related failures should involve sufficient amount of redundancy of hardware like
wireless routers, 3G cards, remote clients like PDAs/Laptops, RFiD readers.
Below we discuss different fault types detected by DiNAR in our present
implementation for DIORAMA and the recovery measures:
Application Failure: At the disaster site, application failures could mean inability
to read information from the RFiD readers. Hence if the correlation algorithm
tags the RFiD reader interfacing application as root cause failure, then the
administrator looking at this picture should instruct the paramedics at the
disaster site to, restart the application on the tracking device. If this fault is
accompanied with a non root cause alarm for the RFiD reader, then it is
advisable to look at the operational status of the RFiD reader as well.
Application Unresponsive: If any application is being reported as unresponsive,
then its status should be monitored for 2-3 update cycles. This is to allow the
application to become responsive again, as it is not an uncommon event for an
application to not respond at certain intervals. If the alarm does not clear, the
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administrator should direct the paramedics about the situation and restart this
application.
RFiD-Reader Down: Hard failures of the RFiD reader will lead to a root cause
fault being shown in the DiNAR GUI. The administrator should immediately
direct the paramedic to replace the concerned reader and restart the interfacing
application to do the initial handshake. This is needed considering the
importance of the RFiD reader in the whole setup of DIORAMA and also the
fact that troubleshooting it will take more time in an already time critical
application.
Device Down: This alarm applies to a non responsive agent which is declared to
be down by the DiNAR manager. Handling this alarm will be relatively different
than the others as described above. It is due to the fact that this alarm is deduced
due to an agent which did not respond for two update cycles followed by 1 mins
wait time. This could have three possible causes:
o Device failure (shutdown/reboot)
o Agent Failure (Agent application crash)
o Network failure. Unable to connect to the Internet.
We will deal with the recovery steps for “Network Failure” later. From
DIORAMA perspective, the recovery steps should involve:

Check to see if the device is up and running. Make sure the agent is
running. This can be done by tailing the agent logs. The other method
would be to check the DIORAMA server to see if the device is
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reporting data. If so it is an agent failure and the agent needs to be
restart.
If the device is down physically, then it should be replaced with a
backup device before beginning the troubleshooting.

Checking for the agent failure before the more severe possibility makes sure that the
DiNAR operations does to hamper the core operations of DIORAMA.
Cloud Unresponsive: A CloudUnresponsive alarm hints at a problem in the
network connectivity. This is triggered when all the agents behind a particular
cloud are down. The administrator should direct the paramedics to first replace
the existing wireless gateway with a backup (having same SSID) and make sure
all the devices are reconnected to the new wireless gateway. If this still does not
clear the alarm, then each and every agent should be checked as explained
above.
6.2. Remote Site
Remote site in DIORAMA is normally a command center with good wired network
connectivity and high performance servers. Hence recovery measures in this site are not
as complicated as in the disaster site. Failures in remote site would include:
Application Down/Unresponsive
Server failure
Network failure
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The failures on the remote server, once detected can be corrected by regular
hardware/software/network recovery processes. It does not need any special instructions
unlike components in the disaster site.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Design of DiNAR was aimed to be an end to end solution for managing disaster
response systems and provide real time fault detection. This thesis work was an effort to
prove this concept. With its current architecture and implementation, DiNAR can also
apply to other distributed application scenarios which have their elements distributed
and use only internet to connect among themselves, with no overlays. One other
example of such application is an Intel Health Guide [1] which is an in house patient
monitoring system. Nevertheless, disaster management systems are still the most
relevant applications for DiNAR.
The main contribution of this thesis work in designing DiNAR was the design and
implementation of the DiNAR manager-agent architecture and agent initiated collection
method. We implemented the analysis engine using the dependency graph algorithm
which helped DiNAR from just being a collection schema to a solution.
Future Work:
One of the wrong design choices of DiNAR was the use of external IP for
grouping agents in a cloud. This mechanism is not flexible to accommodate the
usage of cellular network for data connectivity. Hence new methods should be
explored.
Developing the agent for more platforms, mainly mobile device.

51

`

APPENDIX
DIORAMA OVERVIEW
DIORAMA is a system designed with an aim to expedite the EMS triaging process. It is
a solution designed by the Multimedia Networking Lab, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. It uses the active RfID technology to track the victims after disaster and
collects all the data about the victims, their locations and beams it to a server which is
on the other side of the Internet.
Diorama System Architecture:

Figure 18 shows the system architecture of

DIORAMA. On a broad level DIORAMA can be visualized to be divided into two
zones:


Disaster Site: Where the actual disaster has occurred and where the
Emergency MS triaging process will be carried out.



Remote Site: The place where a server resides and collects all information
from the disaster site.

The disaster site can be visualized as an open area which has been affected and has
victims scattered around. This is shown in Figure 17. Each of the circular zones is one
disaster site. Normal Emergency Medical Services (EMS) procedures [2] involves a
triaging round where the paramedics arrive at the disaster site and triage the victims
using paper tags. These tags contain information about the victim and his present status.
Although this triaging technique has been in place since a long time, applying modern
day Information Technology (IT) to it can revolutionize the whole process. This is what
DIORAMA aims to achieve.
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Figure 17 DIORAMA Overview
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